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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 18-1976 
__________ 
 
MICHAEL TELZER, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
BOROUGH OF ENGLEWOOD CLIFFS, (Its Directors, Officers, Servants, Agents, 
Assignees, Delegates, and/or Employees); ENGLEWOOD CLIFFS POLICE 
DEPARTMENT, (Its Directors, Officers, Servants, Agents, Assignees, Delegates and/or 
Employees); MICHAEL CIOFFI, Englewood Cliffs Chief of Police; LT. WILLIAM 
LARAIA; SGT. GERARD MCDERMOTT; SGT. DANIEL MORRISSEY; POLICE 
OFFICER DAVID HILL; POLICE OFFICER RONALD WALDT; JOHN AND JANE 
DOES(S) AND XYZ CORPORATIONS(S), fictitious names and parties intending to 
designee the entity/entities responsible for causing Plaintiff's cause of action and injuries 
and intending to designate then person/persons responsible for causing Plaintiff's cause of 
action and injuries 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:13-cv-04306) 
District Judge:  Honorable John M. Vazquez 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 1, 2019 
Before:  CHAGARES, BIBAS and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: August 12, 2019) 
___________ 
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OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant Michael Telzer appeals from the judgment entered against him in 
his civil rights case.  For the following reasons, we will affirm. 
 In July 2013, Telzer filed a complaint, presenting various claims arising from his 
arrest, detention, and subsequent prosecution, based on charges of lewdness and 
endangering the welfare of a child.  Telzer later filed an amended complaint. 
 Telzer’s allegation arise from the following undisputed facts.  On July 14, 2011, 
Telzer was walking along the track at Witte Field in Englewood Cliffs.  During this time, 
Nealy Nusbaum Erber (“Erber”) placed a 9-1-1 call, reporting that she had seen a man 
walking the field with “his self exposed,” and that she was at the field with her children.  
Officers McDermott and Waldt responded to the call; Officer McDermott spoke with 
Erber and Officer Waldt approached Telzer (as he fit the description that Erber provided 
in her 9-1-1 call).  When Officer McDermott approached Erber, she identified Telzer as 
the party who had exposed himself.  Meanwhile, Officer Waldt approached Telzer, 
informing him of the report that a white man was exposing himself at the field and asking 
Telzer to lift his shirt.  Telzer complied and Officer Waldt verbally indicated that Telzer’s 
belt was completely unbuckled and his zipper was undone (this conversation was 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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captured on Waldt’s mobile in-car video system).  Erber thereafter provided two written 
statements to the police (on July 14, 2011 and on July 15, 2011).   
 Telzer was subsequently arrested and indicted by a grand jury on lewdness and 
endangering charges, see N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:14-4 & N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:24:-4.  Telzer was 
tried before a jury, which found him not guilty on both charges.  Telzer presented the 
following claims in his amended complaint:  false arrest, false imprisonment, and 
malicious prosecution in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law; witness and 
evidence tampering; withholding evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland; violations 
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; supervisory liability based on the failure to 
train officers; and supervisory liability against Defendant Cioffi. 
 After discovery, the District Court granted defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment.  On appeal, Telzer argues that the District Court’s grant of summary judgment 
was in error since “all material facts are in dispute.”  See Pro Se Brief, at 4.  More 
specifically, he argues that there was no probable cause to support his arrest, detention, 
and prosecution, that the District Court ignored several exculpatory statements made by 
the witness, and that Officer McDermott “coached” the witness and invented the crime. 
I.  
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District Court’s 
grant of summary judgment de novo and view all inferences drawn from the underlying 
facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.  Montone v. City of Jersey City, 
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709 F.3d 181, 189 (3d Cir. 2013).  Summary judgment is proper only if the record 
“shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
II.  
 The District Court properly granted summary judgment to the defendants on 
Claims 1 and 2, in which Telzer brought false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious 
prosecution claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law.  To prevail on § 1983 claims 
based on false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him.  See James v. City of 
Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 680, 682–83 (3d Cir. 2012); Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 
81–82 (3d Cir. 2007).  “Probable cause exists whenever reasonably trustworthy 
information or circumstances within a police officer’s knowledge are sufficient to 
warrant a person of reasonable caution to conclude that an offense has been committed by 
the person being arrested.”  United States v. Myers, 308 F.3d 251, 255 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).  Necessarily, the analysis is based on the 
objective facts available to the officers at the time of the arrest.  Although the issue of 
probable cause is usually a factual one, a district court may conclude “that probable cause 
did exist as a matter of law if the evidence, viewed most favorably to Plaintiff, reasonably 
would not support a contrary factual finding.”  Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 
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514 (3d Cir. 2003) (quotation marks omitted) (citing Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 
396, 401 (3d Cir. 1997)).  That is the case here, as the District Court correctly held. 
 The information provided by Erber’s 9-1-1 call, Telzer’s appearance at the field, 
and Erber’s subsequent police statements provided the officers with sufficient 
information to have probable cause that Telzer violated N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:14-4 
(lewdness) and N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:24-4 (endangering welfare of children).1  See Myers, 
                                              
1 N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:14-4(b)(1) states that a person commits lewdness in the fourth degree 
if: 
 
He exposes his intimate parts for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the 
sexual desire of the actor or of any other person under circumstances where 
the actor knows or reasonably expects he is likely to be observed by a child 
who is less than 13 years of age where the actor is at least four years older 
than the child. 
 
N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:24-4(a)(1)(i) provides that: 
 
(a)(1) Any person having a legal duty for the care of a child or who has 
assumed responsibility for the care of a child who engages in sexual 
conduct which would impair or debauch the morals of the child is guilty of 
a crime of the second degree. Any other person who engages in conduct or 
who causes harm as described in this paragraph to a child is guilty of a 
crime of the third degree. 
 
(b) (1) As used in this subsection: 
 
“Prohibited sexual act” means 
 
(i) Nudity, if depicted for the purpose of sexual stimulation or gratification 
of any person who may view such depiction.  
 
See also State v. Hackett, 764 A.2d 421, 428 (N.J. 2001) (concluding that a jury 
reasonably found a defendant guilty of endangering the welfare of a child when, inter 
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308 F.3d at 255.  In Telzer’s opposition to the defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment, Telzer concedes that Erber’s 9-1-1 call indicated that she observed a man 
walking around the park “with his self exposed,” and further stated that she was at the 
park with her kids.  See dkt # 71-2, ¶ 4–6.  When officers arrived at the scene, Erber 
identified Telzer as the man who had exposed himself.  See dkt # 66-7, at 25; dkt # 66-6, 
at 131.  Upon approaching Telzer, Officer Waldt asked Telzer to lift up his shirt, and 
Officer Waldt noted that Telzer’s zipper was down and open, and his belt was unbuckled.  
See Id.; dkt # 66-7, at 7–8.  Though Telzer disputes this fact, it is corroborated by the 
audio recording by Officer Waldt’s mobile in-car video system.  See Scott v. Harris, 550 
U.S. 372, 380–81 (2007) (explaining that, at the summary judgment stage, courts should 
“view[] the facts in the light depicted by the videotape”).  Telzer explained his 
appearance to Officer Waldt by describing himself as “a sloppy dresser.”  Dkt # 66-7, at 
                                              
alia, the defendant “allowed himself to be viewed naked, through an unobstructed 
window, by girls who were age thirteen and under”). 
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25.2  Given these undisputed facts, probable cause for the arrest existed as a matter of 
law.  See Marasco, 318 F.3d at 514.3 
 In addition, Erber provided two statements to police, one the day of the incident 
and one the following day, which are both consistent with her 9-1-1 call.  See dkt # 66-6, 
at 89, 91.  Though not included in her first statement, Erber’s second statement indicated 
that, after the incident, her nine-year-old daughter told her that she too had seen Telzer’s 
“privates” when at the field.  Id. at 91.  Telzer argues, but provides no facts to support his 
argument, that this addition in her second statement (and all subsequent testimony) was 
due to “coaching” by Officer McDermott.  See Pro Se Brief, at 4–13.  See Chavarriaga v. 
N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 218 (3d Cir. 2015) (noting that the party opposing 
summary judgment “must point to specific factual evidence showing that there is a 
genuine dispute on a material issue requiring resolution at trial”).  In any event, we note, 
                                              
2 The recording from Officer Waldt’s mobile in-car video system does not show the 
conversation that took place between Officer Waldt and Telzer, but the conversation can 
be heard on the recording.  Officer Waldt is heard stating that Telzer’s zipper was down 
and belt was unbuckled.  Telzer did not dispute that characterization of his appearance at 
the time of the conversation, but instead explained that his appearance was due to him 
being a “sloppy dresser.” 
 
3 Telzer argues that a strap of his shorts was sticking through his cargo shorts and that 
Erber apparently confused this for Telzer exposing himself.  Although this might explain 
why a finder of fact was not able to find him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, the test here 
is simply one of probable cause.  Even if Erber had been mistaken about what she saw, 
the report, the identification of Telzer, and Telzer’s statement about being a “sloppy 
dresser” demonstrate the existence of probable cause.  
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the fact that Erber’s daughter also saw Telzer exposing himself is further confirmed by 
Officer Morrissey’s supplemental police report, which stated that the daughter told him 
that she also saw Telzer’s privates hanging out of his pants while at the field.  See dkt # 
66-7, at 62.  Thus, based on these facts, the District Court was correct to conclude that 
there was no genuine issue of material fact and that there was probable cause4 to arrest 
and prosecute Telzer with lewdness and endangering the welfare of a child.5 
 Telzer has made numerous arguments against probable cause.  On appeal, Telzer 
argues that the District Court’s conclusion was in error due to “[e]xculpatory 
[s]tatements” Erber made to the offers.  Pro Se Brief, at 2–4.  However, the exculpatory 
statements Telzer points to in his brief merely show Erber doubting herself and worrying 
whether the police will have enough evidence.  They do not, as Telzer suggests, 
exculpate Telzer of the charges or create a dispute of material facts regarding the 
                                              
4 In addition to the above discussion of probable cause, “in a [§] 1983 malicious 
prosecution action . . . a grand jury indictment or presentment, [which occurred in this 
case,] constitutes prima facie evidence of probable cause to prosecute.”  Rose v. Bartle, 
871 F.2d 331, 353 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
5 The District Court analyzed Claims 1 and 2 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as under the 
New Jersey Civil Rights Act (“NJCRA”) and New Jersey common law.  Because § 1983 
claims and NJCRA claims are analyzed nearly identically, the District Court correctly 
analyzed them together.  See, e.g., Trafton v. City of Woodbury, 799 F.Supp.2d 417, 443 
(D.N.J. 2001); see also Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 121 n.12 (3d Cir. 2000).  
Because the state-law claims all require a showing a probable cause, see Mesgleski v. 
Oraboni, 748 A.2d 1130, 1139 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000); LoBiondo v. Schwartz, 
970 A.2d 1007, 1022 (N.J. 2009), the defendants were entitled to summary judgment as 
to these claims under New Jersey common law as well. 
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existence of probable cause.6  Telzer additionally argues, as he did in the District Court, 
that the officers coerced Erber and her daughter to lie.  However, as noted by the District 
Court, there is no evidence in the summary judgment record to support this claim, and in 
fact, statements made by Erber in her deposition flatly refute it.  See dkt # 66-6, at 126.  
Accordingly, the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on Claims 1 and 2 was 
proper. 
III.  
  In Claims 3 and 4, Telzer argues that the defendants engaged in witness 
tampering and evidence tampering, in violation of New Jersey criminal laws N.J. Stat. 
Ann. 2C:28-5(a) and N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:28-6.  Telzer has pointed to no caselaw 
suggesting that these criminal statutes create a private right of action, and we are not 
aware of any.  The District Court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants on these claims. 
IV.  
 In Claim 5, Telzer alleges that the defendants violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 
U.S. 83 (1963), by withholding evidence at his criminal trial, including clearer 
photographs, video recordings, and forensic test results.  Telzer asserted this claim 
                                              
6 In some circumstances, a complaining witness’s doubts may prevent a finding of 
probable cause.  Here, however, the fact that Officer Waldt observed Telzer’s open zipper 
and unbuckled belt, which was consistent with Erber’s claim, helped establish the 
existence of probable cause. 
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against the police officers involved with his arrest.  See Gibson v. Superintendent of N.J. 
Dep’t of Law & Pub. Safety-Div. of State Police, 411 F.3d 427, 443 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(holding that “police officers and other state actors may be liable under § 1983 for failing 
to disclose exculpatory information to the prosecutor”), overruled on other grounds by 
Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2010).  We agree that the defendants 
were entitled to summary judgment on Telzer’s Brady claim.  “A Brady violation occurs 
if:  (1) the evidence at issue is favorable to the accused, because either exculpatory or 
impeaching; (2) the prosecution withheld it; and (3) the defendant was prejudiced 
because the evidence was ‘material.’”  Breakiron v. Horn, 642 F.3d 126, 133 (3d Cir. 
2011).  As we discussed in Smith v. Holtz, “the Constitution is not violated every time 
the government fails or chooses not to disclose evidence that might prove helpful to the 
defense”; instead, the government’s failure to disclose evidence rises to the level of a due 
process violation only if the failure to disclose “undermines confidence in the outcome of 
the trial.”  210 F.3d 186, 196 (3d Cir. 2000).  Because Telzer was acquitted of the charges 
against him, we conclude that no conduct by the defendants has undermined our 
confidence in the outcome of the trial and thus this case does not implicate Brady.  See 
Morgan v. Gertz, 166 F.3d 1307, 1310 (10th Cir. 1999) (“Regardless of any misconduct 
by government agents before or during trial, a defendant who is acquitted cannot be said 
to have been deprived of the right to a fair trial.”); Flores v. Satz, 137 F.3d 1275, 1278 
(11th Cir. 1998) (“Plaintiff, however, was never convicted and, therefore, did not suffer 
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the effects of an unfair trial.  As such, the facts of this case do not implicate the 
protections of Brady.”). 
V.  
 In Claims 6, 7 and 8, Telzer asserts violations of his rights to due process and 
equal protection.  These claims were wholly undeveloped in the District Court, as Telzer 
failed to provide any factual support for them in his amended complaint.  For that matter, 
it is not clear whether Telzer has argued these claims on appeal.  In any event, we agree 
with the District Court that summary judgment was proper on these claims. 
VI.  
 In Claim 9, Telzer asserts a claim based on Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 
U.S. 658 (1978), alleging that the Englewood Cliffs Police Department and its 
supervisors are liable for the failure to train Englewood Cliffs’ officers.  In Claim 10, 
Telzer asserts a claim of supervisory liability pursuant to § 1983 against Defendant 
Cioffi.  The District Court correctly concluded that the Englewood Cliffs Police 
Department and Defendant Cioffi were entitled to summary judgment. 
 “[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or, 
in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat 
superior theory.”  Id. at 691.  Pursuant to Monell, Telzer could assert a claim under § 
1983 against the police department only if the alleged constitutional violation involved a 
policy officially adopted by the department or where, although not officially adopted, the 
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violation arose from the local government’s “custom.”  Id. at 690–91; see also Beck v. 
City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996).  Additionally, supervisors are 
generally not vicariously liable for their subordinates’ acts.  See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 
845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).  Supervisory liability is allowed, however, if the 
supervisors:  (1) “established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly 
caused the constitutional harm”; or (2) “they participated in violating plaintiff's rights, 
directed others to violate them, or, as the persons in charge, had knowledge of and 
acquiesced in their subordinates’ violations.”  Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 330 (3d 
Cir. 2016). 
 Telzer has not proffered evidence of either an official policy or an unofficial 
custom that caused his arrest or any other alleged constitutional violation.  Furthermore, 
Telzer failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding the involvement of the 
Englewood Cliffs Police Department or Defendant Cioffi in any unconstitutional 
conduct, since Telzer failed to show any violation of his rights.  Thus, the District Court 
properly granted summary judgment on these claims. 
 
VII.  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  In 
addition, we deny Appellant’s and Appellees’ requests for oral argument.  See L.A.R. 
34.1(a).  Appellant’s motion to lodge exhibits is granted; however, we have not 
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considered any commentary on the exhibits that was not presented to the District Court, 
see United States v. Donsky, 825 F.2d 746, 749 (3d Cir. 1987), and, to that extent only, 
Appellees’ motion to strike is granted.  
